By Harsh V. Pant
The Tribune
Aug 28, 2008
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has just returned from Japan where he attended the G-8 summit as a special invitee, and many in the country are arguing that India deserves a permanent place in G-8 and other international institutions as India is already a major global player. Most of the challenges that the international community faces today cannot be resolved without India’s active participation.
There is some merit in this argument and many across the world are beginningto realise the importance of India in the global inter-state hierarchy. Yet, India itself has not shown that it is ready for this larger global role. After all, if India is a major global power, what is it doing about the security environment in its immediate neighbourhood?
Forget China’s rise, global climate change and the nuclear deal. All these dwarf in front of the challenge India faces in Afghanistan, which is on the brink of collapse even as New Delhi continues to dither on how to respond adequately to the rapidly changing ground realities there.
India no longer has the luxury to argue that while it is happy to help the Afghan government in its reconstruction efforts, it will not be directly engaged in security operations. The Taliban militants who blew up the Indian Embassy have sent a strong signal that India is part of the evolving security dynamic in Afghanistan despite its reluctance to take on a more active role in the military operations.
The progress towards stabilisation and development in Afghanistan is being heavily influenced by India and Pakistan, and the rivalry between them. Pakistan has always been suspicious of New Delhi and Kabul cooperating against it, and as India’s influence in Afghanistan has increased in the post-Taliban scenario, Pakistan remains stalled in its efforts to curb extremists. Pakistan’s failure to contain cross-border militancy has been a key factor behind its deteriorating relations with the Karzai government in Kabul.
Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have long been complex, with Islamabad’s military-intelligence establishment contributing to the defeat of Soviet troops before 1988; the overthrow of Soviet-backed President Muhammad Najibullah in 1992; and the capture of large areas of Afghanistan by the Taliban after 1994. Several long-standing strategic interests fuelled Pakistan’s involvement in these developments.
It has long believed that it can gain “strategic depth” against India by influencing politics in Kabul, something Islamabad felt it achieved in the 1980s and 1990s. It is keen to prevent “strategic encirclement” as a result of closer Delhi-Kabul ties. Pakistan is wary of Afghanistan (or India) exerting influence on its restive populations in border regions such as Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province.
However, the perceived gains of the last two decades have been increasingly under threat since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. After the terrorist attacks in the United States, President Pervez Musharraf had to choose between support for the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and its “war on terrorism”, and isolation as a backer of radical Islamic extremism. Mr Musharraf promptly signed Pakistan up as an ally of Washington. This committed Pakistan to supporting efforts to stabilise Afghanistan and to strengthen the administration of President Hamid Karzai.
However, there are considerable doubts about Islamabad’s capacity and commitment to crack down on militants. Kabul is deeply suspicious of Pakistan, on whom its security is largely dependent. Pakistan’s ISI is linked to the resurgence of the Taliban, whose leadership is thought to be operating from the tribal border regions. The rejuvenation of the Taliban has potential benefits for Pakistan in bolstering its role as a frontline state in the war against terrorism, thereby securing engagement from the United States.
The security problems in Afghanistan can be linked to the military’s continuing position as the predominant force in Pakistan, an institution that has, since the 1990s, viewed the Taliban as a means of controlling Afghanistan and undercutting India’s influence there. Having focused exclusively on the Taliban, it is struggling to abandon it now.
Meanwhile, as tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have increased, India’s relations with Afghanistan have steadily improved. Unlike Pakistan, ties between India and Afghanistan are not hampered by the existence of a contiguous, and contested, border. India’s support for the Northern Alliance (against the Pakistan-backed Taliban) in the 1990s strengthened its position in Kabul after 2001.
Many members of the Alliance are members of the government or hold influential provincial posts. New Delhi is one of Afghanistan’s top six donors, having extended a $750 million aid package and most of its aid is unconditional, directed largely at reconstruction projects as well as education and rural development. Kabul is also encouraging Indian businesses to take advantage of its low-tax regime to help develop a manufacturing hub in areas such as cement, oil and gas, electricity, and in services like hotels, banking and communications.
Mr Karzai may not be deliberately crafting a New Delhi-Kabul alliance against Islamabad, but he is certainly hoping to push Pakistan into taking his concerns more seriously. India has opened consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad, in addition to its embassy in Kabul. Pakistan has accused the embassy in Kabul of spreading anti-Pakistani propaganda and views the establishment of the consulates as a way for New Delhi to improve intelligence-gathering against it.
After targeting the personnel involved in developmental projects and emboldened by India’s non-response, terrorists have now trained their guns directly at the Indian State. India must now respond with greater military engagement to support its developmental and political presence in Afghanistan. If India is to realise its aspirations of emerging as a major global actor, it must first learn to become a net provider of regional security.
This is a difficult task for India, given the wariness with which its neighbours view its capabilities. But India has a few good options given the instability that surrounds it. No major power has emerged historically without providing some measure of stability around its periphery. India should be using its growing capabilities to extend security in the region.
A stable, secure and prosperous neighbourhood is a sine qua non for the emergence of a great power. India cannot be merely seen as free-riding on the outside powers for regional stability. For all the rhetoric emanating from New Delhi about India’s rise, it remains unclear as to what India is ready to do to preserve and enhance its interests in its neighbourhood. India’s approach towards Afghanistan is a casualty of this short-sightedness, and it will cost New Delhi dear over the long-term.
The writer teaches at King’s College, London.
